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Can voters stop state governments from spending at high rates through the enactment of 
tax and expenditure limits (TELs), or do these laws become dead letters?  We draw upon the 
principal-agent literature to theorize that TELs – one of the most frequent uses of the initiative 
process across the country – may be circumvented by the sorts of elected officials who would 
inspire their passage. 
    
In order to investigate our claim, we conduct an event study.  First, we test for the 
effectiveness of TELs across states using a differences-in-differences model.  Second, we dissect 
our treatment variable using different legal provisions of the limits to test whether there is a 
uniform effect across different types of TELs.  Finally, we compare state fiscal patterns before 
and after adoption on a state-by-state basis.  Using this simple approach and other methods, we 
show that TELs are largely ineffective, and that state officials can circumvent them by raising 
money through fees or borrowing.  Our finding is consistent with recent studies showing that 
policies passed through direct democracy can often be thwarted by the politicians charged with 
implementing them.       
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Tax and expenditure limits (TELs) belong to a general class of political phenomena that 
attempt a tough trick: locking in the preferences of a set of political principals by constraining 
the future actions of potentially unknown and hostile agents.  Either voters are trying to limit 
state lawmakers, or legislators in one era are attempting to slow the growth of government under 
future lawmakers.  Regardless, the proponents of these limits face the common delegation 
problem, made especially challenging by the fact that they are trying to constrain the behavior of 
agents long into the future, when they may be unable to monitor these agents. 
We see this challenge as similar to the dilemma faced by legislators attempting to control 
the executive branch (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1984; Shepsle and Weingast 1984; McCubbins 
et. al 1987, 1989; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Epstein and 
O’Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002), legislators on the floor delegating power to 
committees (Fenno 1973; Krehbiel 1991; Rohde 1991; Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005), members of Congress trying to discipline the budgetary decisions of 
future Congresses (Schick 1995, 2005), and voters giving over power to elected officials (Gerber 
et al 2001, 2004).1  Tax and expenditure limits fall into this troublesome category because 
lawmakers charged with implementing a limit may be hostile to the goals of its backers. Why 
else the need for a limit in the first place?  It may also be the case that after the enactment of a 
TEL the principals themselves may change, either by population migration or changes in 
preferences over time.  This means that principals themselves may push the lawmakers to find 
ways around the proscribed limitation.  Either way, it is difficult to tie the sovereigns hands, 
whether we believe that it is the legislature pr the people that is sovereign (North and Weingast 
1989) We suspect that the lawmakers subject to a spending or revenue limit may respond to 
demands by their constituents who want to see government grow at a faster rate than the limit 
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proscribes. Lawmakers may have the ability to circumvent limits in ways that are buried deep in 
the details of thousand-page budget documents.  Because it is difficult to monitor state fiscal 
actions, the initiative proponents who sponsored the TELs may be unable to follow their 
implementation. 
Our main conjecture is that agency problems prevent tax and spending limits from having 
their intended effect of reducing the size of state government.2  This contention stands in contrast 
to the empirical findings of many previous works, such as Misiolek and Elder (1988), Elder 
(1992), Shadbegian (1998), Bails and Tieslau (2000), and New (2001).  However, we suspect 
that much of the previous scholarship that finds TELs to be effective may be based on the flawed 
assumption that TELs uniformly affect fiscal outcomes, and that previous results were driven by 
a few disparate cases. We design our empirical strategy to respond to this challenge.  
We take advantage of the fact that most TELs are a recent phenomenon to conduct 
comparisons of spending before versus after adoption in each TEL state.  We employ an event 
study following the models used in the literature on finance and test the effect of TELs in 
multiple stages.  First, we examine the effect of TELs in a pooled model, where we assume a 
uniform effect of the treatment across states.   It is with this model where we are most likely to 
find an effect.  Second, we break down the different types of TELs and test for the effectiveness 
of specific legal provisions, thereby relaxing the assumption that TELs have a uniform effect. In 
our last model, we examine each state one at a time, emphasizing that for TELs to have a general 
effect there must be evidence at the individual unit of analysis.  Our consistent finding is that 
TELs are almost never effective.  Finally, we explore why TELs do not result in smaller 
government, looking at shifts to charges and fees that occur following the enactment of a TEL.  
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In contrast to much of the previous literature, our results do not prove sanguine for TEL backers, 
and support our conjecture that they rarely overcome their agency problem.   
 
I. Literature Review 
Previous studies explore the effects of TELs by making cross-state comparisons, often 
supplemented by multiple observations of each state’s fiscal activities over time (Abrams and 
Dougan 1986; Misiolek and Elder 1988; Elder 1992; Shadbegian 1996; Mullins and Joyce 1996; 
Shadbegian 1998; Bails and Tieslau 2000; New 2001; Mullins 2004).  They typically regress 
some measure of a state’s fiscal behavior upon a dichotomous variable indicating the presence in 
each state of their institution of interest (a treatment) as well as a set of covariates or “control 
factors” that are meant to make the states in the cross-state comparison actually comparable.  
They interpret the coefficient on their treatment variable as the estimated effect of the TEL. 
For example, Elder (1992) regresses taxes collected on dummy variables indicating 
expenditure limits and revenue limits, along with a vector of control variables for the years 1950-
1985.  He finds differential effects based on the type of limit enacted, noting that “States with 
Revenue limitation laws have experienced no change in tax growth, whereas there is strong 
evidence of a reduction of tax growth in states with expenditure limitations" (Elder 1992, p. 58).   
Bails and Tieslau (2000) use a similar panel research design for the years 1969-1994.  The 
coefficient of their singular TEL dummy variable is significant and negative, indicating to them 
"that real per capita state and local spending in states that have a tax or spending limit in place 
will be more than $41 lower than in those states that do not have such limitations in place" (Bails 
and Tieslau  2000, p. 270).  Finally, New (2001) uses a panel, time series regression from 1972-
1996  to regress annual change in state and local expenditures on TEL dummy variables 
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indicating TELs passed by citizen initiative or by the legislature.  He states that "The model 
predicts that, if other factors are held constant, per capita state and local expenditures will 
decrease by $16.29 every year after a state has passed a TEL by citizen initiative. Conversely, 
the model predicts that TELs enacted by state legislatures will actually cause per capita 
expenditures to increase by $14.00" (New 2001, p. 8).  His interpretation, however, does not 
follow traditional confidence levels of statistical significance. 
Other authors have come to contradictory empirical conclusions using a cross-sectional 
research design. Abrams and Dougan (1986) conduct a cross-sectional regression for the year 
1980.  They find that constitutional limits, the subject of their analysis, are statistically 
insignificant in all of their models.  However, they note that "it is quite possible that the 
endogenous nature of such limits may obscure their true effects" and that a "single equation 
cross-section regressions may fail to estimate the full impact of those limits".  They therefore do 
not "reject with the appropriate degree of confidence that the hypothesis that Constitutional 
Limits [their treatment variable] reduces spending." Mullins and Joyce (1996) regress state fiscal 
limitations on four dimensions of fiscal structure (government size, revenue source reliance, state 
revenue shares, state expenditure shares) in a panel study for the years 1970-1990.  They 
conclude that "state limitations appear to have a very limited effect" (Mullins and Joyce 1996, p. 
95). 
There have been several other studies of the effectiveness of TELs that use improved 
research designs.  Cox and Lowery (1990), updated in King-Meadows and Lowery (1996), for 
example, conduct regression analysis individually on three TEL states (Michigan, South Carolina, 
and Tennessee) and compare the results to three comparable states without TELs (Ohio, North 
Carolina, and Kentucky, respectively).  They find no evidence that any TEL worked in the 1990 
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analysis, and only marginal evidence in the 1996 analysis as Tennessee then showed a decrease in 
spending.  This is a strong research design, complete with both a pretest and a comparable group, 
but is limited in its scope since only three TEL states were considered.  
A few other authors follow the research design we turn to first, an interrupted time series.  
Howard (1989) looks at changes in the ratio of state taxes collected to personal income before and 
after implementation of a TEL.  She finds no significant alterations in this ratio both when pooled 
between all TEL states and within single states in comparison to non-TEL states. Similarly, Bails 
(1990) takes the average percent change of revenue and expenditures for TEL states and non-TEL 
states.  Using a difference of means test, he does not find a significant difference between the 
two.  Stansel (1994) compares state fiscal activities before and after TEL passage, finding that 
some measures seem to work while others fail.  Finally, Joyce and Mullins (1991) chart 
deviations of TEL states from the national average in several revenue and expenditure categories. 
They argue that “states with local TELs have short term overall declines, but state taxes 
increased in the long term for those states.”  Though the empirics of these efforts are relatively 
straightforward, they succeed in resolving some of the challenges posed by endogeneity because 
they compare states before and after adoption, relative to a comparable group.  This time series 
approach holds constant the unmodeled differences between states that might make some more 
likely than others to adopt TELs. 
By contrast, studies that rely primarily on cross-sectional variation across disparate states 
may produce biased estimates of TEL effects due to the potential endogeneity of TEL adoption.  
It is quite possible that the forces that lead to TEL passage also affect a state’s fiscal choices.  If 
so, the endogeneity previously noted by Rueben (1997, p. 8) and by Shadbegian (1998, pp. 125-
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26) represents a significant challenge to the inferences made in these cross-sectional studies. 
 One possible source of this endogeneity is that states that implement spending or revenue caps 
may also have a different sort of electorate—that is, one more inclined to keep the size of 
government small (Joyce and Mullins 1991).  Such differences are not surprising given other 
evidence that spending is systematically different in states with an initiative or referendum 
process (Matsusaka 1995, 2000, 2004).   
For the study of TELs, concerns about endogeneity can take two possible forms.  First, 
since TELs are not randomly assigned across states, the types of states that adopt them may be 
very different than the types of states that do not. 3   A cross-sectional investigation of their 
effects might suffer from this sort of bias, but our differences-in-differences approach controls 
for the constant characteristics of states that can determine TEL adoption. 
Second, since TELs are not randomly assigned across time within adopting states, there 
may be a shift toward a lower-spending "mood" in a state that occurs simultaneous with 
adoption.  Our approach does not solve this problem.  But note that because we do not find any 
apparent TEL effect, this sort of endogeneity raises little cause for concern.  If a shift to a low-
spending mood came at the same time as TEL adoption, one might find an apparent TEL effect 
and wonder whether it was instead caused by the shift in mood.  But we do not find that spending 
is lower after TEL adoptions.  Neither a shift in mood nor a shift in laws brings a clear change in 
state spending, so we have no worries about untangling the effects of mood and law. 
Beyond concerns about endogeneity, we contend that many studies, including panel 
studies, incorrectly assume that TELs have a uniform effect, regardless of their specific 
provisions or method of passage.4  As we later demonstrate, not all TELs are created equal.  By 
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unpooling the data and separately analyzing each TEL, we can conduct a more fine-grained 
analysis that relaxes the assumption that TELs of all types have the same effects.   
Regardless of the approach and techniques used, the literature is mixed on whether TELs 
do or do not effectively limit revenues and expenditures.  We believe that this topic is important 
enough to merit renewed attention with increased consideration of research design.  This topic is 
important because the effectiveness of tax and expenditure limits – often passed via direct 
democracy – fits in with a larger controversy in the literature on the initiative process.  Currently, 
there is a significant debate between works which find that the initiative process is an effective 
check on the legislature and helps move policy toward the median voter’s preferences (Bowler, 
Donovan, and Tolbert 1998; Gerber 1996, 1998, 1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Matsusaka & 
McCarty 2001), and research contending that initiative victories are ephemeral and that the devil 
is in the implementation (Gerber et al. 2001, Bali 2003, Gerber et al. 2004; Garrett and 
McCubbins 2008).  Since many TELs have been initiated or endorsed by voters, our analysis 
here can contribute to this larger debate.  
 
II. Data and Methods 
 
The research design we employ in this study is similar to that most commonly used in the 
financial literature (see MacKinlay 1997 for a survey).  As suggested by MacKinlay, the gold 
standard for event studies is to test the effect of the event on each case individually.  The silver 
standard is combining these individual results and checking to see if the combined effects are 
real or due to chance alone.  For instance, if the event truly has no effect, then on average half 
the firms should have positive abnormal returns and half negative.  Finally, the bronze standard 
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is pooling all cases together and testing for a common effect.  This last approach is the easiest 
hurdle to surmount and the one that we start with for a first look at the effectiveness of TELs. 
A fundamental analysis of the effectiveness of a TEL begins with a full understanding of 
its actual language and structure. No two TELs are exactly the same, as they can vary across 
numerous legal and political dimensions. Mullins and Wallin (2004, p.9) note that state 
government TELs take the form of revenue limits, expenditure limits, a combination of both, or 
restrictions on “growth in general fund expenditures or appropriations,” and that they can be 
“tied to growth in population, income, prices, the economy, or wages.”  In addition, Poterba and 
Rubin (1999) argue that they can be binding or not.  Following Poterba and Rubin, our definition 
of TELs is limited to those that constrain the whole of taxing and spending, not single segments 
such as property tax limits.5 Table 1 reports the presence and timing of TEL enactments, as well 
as two key provisions of the laws.   In our second model testing TEL effectiveness, we use such 
provisions to categorize TELs into different types, testing each of these types of TEL to see if 
any of them affect spending.                   
  [Insert Table 1 Here] 
The dependent variables in our analysis measure state and local fiscal behavior.  Our 
dependent variable follows the type of TEL.  To measure a spending limit’s overall 
effectiveness, we look at whether it changes total state and local spending levels. To measure a 
revenue limit’s overall effectiveness, we look at whether it changes total state and local revenue 
levels. For each, we look at per capita levels, reported in appropriate editions of the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s annual State and Local Government Finance publication.6  We collected this time 
series from fiscal year 1969 to 2000, and deflated all estimates by the implicit price deflator.7  
We prefer to use state and local fiscal behavior rather than state-only fiscal behavior for two 
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reasons.  First, almost half of all TELs adopted in the U.S. include provisions that limit both 
levels of government.  Second, if the result of a TEL is simply to push fiscal burdens down to 
lower levels in order to substitute local spending or revenue for states dollars, this consequence is 
not in line with the spirit of tax and expenditure limits, even if it technically follows the letter of 
the law.  We expect this sort of substitution to be typical if the TEL makes it possible.  As an 
additional check on our results, however, we also collect state-only spending.8  Our measure of 
state and local spending is direct general expenditures, whereas our measure of state-only 
spending is total expenditures.  The type of state and local revenue in our series is general 
revenue from own sources.  
We collected our covariates, all of which we expect will lead to an increase in spending 
or revenues, as follows:  
a. Per-capita income is measured as total personal income divided by total population and 
deflated by the consumer price index. We collected this time series from fiscal years 
1971 to 2000 using estimates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
b. The elderly population rate is calculated as the number of persons 65 years or older 
divided by the state’s total population. We collected this time series from fiscal years 
1971 to 2000 using estimates from the Census Bureau.9  
c. The school-age population rate is calculated as the number of persons ages five to 
seventeen divided by the state’s total population. We collected this time series from fiscal 
years 1971 to 2000 using estimates from the Census Bureau. 
d. Political variables on the party controlling each house of the state legislature and 
governor’s office were collected for the years 1971 to 2000 using Council of State 
Governments’ Book of the States.  Each variable takes on the value of one if the 
Democratic Party controls the chamber/office and zero otherwise.   
 
III. A Panel Study; Differences-in-Differences 
 
In this section, we present the results of differences-in-differences tests (DD estimation) 
of the effect of TELs.  Here we are assuming that the effect of TELs is uniform across states, 
regardless of the differences in their letter of their laws.  As noted, this specification of the model 
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is the first step in our three-part event study.  This should be the easiest hurdle to surmount since 
it is possible that results will be driven by a few disparate cases.  
 A differences-in-differences analysis is the most widely used econometric technique for 
observational studies of policy impacts (Wooldridge 2002). In a DD estimation, one compares 
the difference in outcomes before and after the policy intervention for groups that were given the 
policy treatment to the same difference for unaffected groups.  In the language of research 
design, this is a two-group, nonequivalent group design with both pre-test and post-test 
observations.  As before, we use this estimator to test the often-made political prediction that 
TELs would slow the growth of spending in states that passed them, while spending in 
unconstrained states would continue to skyrocket.  DD estimation allows us to compare the 
spending patterns of states with TELs against those in states that never adopted limits both 
before and after adoption, conducting both a pre-test and a post-test for treatment and 
comparison groups. If states with similar spending levels before the tax revolt diverge after one 
of them passes a TEL, then the implication is that this change resulted from the institution itself. 
Our differences-in-differences specification is as follows: 
∆(FBit) = α + β1 (TELit) + γ1∆(SAPit) + γ2(SAPit) + γ3∆(EPit) + γ4(EPit) + γ5∆(PCIit) + γ6(PCIit) +  
γ7(HDit) + γ8(SDit) + γ9(GDit) + Si + Dt +εit 
Variables are indexed for state i and year t.  Where FB is state fiscal behavior (state and local 
revenue for revenue limits, state and local spending for spending limits), TEL is the presence of a 
tax and expenditure limit, SAP is the school age population rate, EP is the elderly population 
rate, PCI is per-capita income, HD is a dummy variable coded as one if the state’s lower house 
has democratic party majority, SD is a dummy variable coded as one is a state’s upper house has 
a democratic party majority, GD is a dummy variable coded as one if a state’s governor is a 
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member of the democratic party, S stands for a vector of state fixed effects, and D a vector of 
times dummies.   The latter two terms are crucial to differences-in-differences estimation, as they 
serve the purpose of holding constant differences in the differences between states and any 
changes due to common trends.   
In all specifications of our models, we first difference the data, as this, we believe is the 
variable subject to political choice.  It also helps to correct for autocorrelation.  This latter point 
is important to our analysis because, as noted by Bertrand et al. (2003), serial correlation often 
inflates standard errors in DD estimation leading to over-rejection of the null hypothesis.  Indeed, 
from a series of simulations, those authors found effects “significant at the 5 percent level for up 
to 45 percent of the placebo interventions.”  (Bertrand et al 2003, 1).  First differencing the data 
has the secondary benefit of relaxing the common trend assumption, implicit in all differences–
in-difference estimation (See Moffit 1991 for a review).  The common trend assumption is that, 
after controlling for changes in relevant factors such as per-capita income and population 
increases, control and treatment cases follow identical trends that are fully captured by time 
dummies.  By detrending the data using first-differences, we reduce the likelihood that 
uncommon trends create spurious correlations.     
                       [Insert Tables 2 & 3 Here] 
Table 2 presents the results for both state and local and state only spending.  Table 3 
presents the results for state and local revenue.  We estimate our models using panel correlated 
standard errors.  In each of these models, the coefficient on the TEL term is negative but falls 
short of statistical significance, even though we analyze 1420 cases.10  More specifically, in the 
models of state and local fiscal behavior, the coefficient on the effect of TELs falls just above the 
15% level of significance for the effect of spending limits on state and local spending, and barely 
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below this level for the effect of revenue limits on state and local revenue.11   The effect of TELs 
on state only spending does not approach significance in any model.   While this model provides 
sufficient statistical proof that TELs, by themselves, do not have a significant effect, it is 
worthwhile to discern the conditions under with TELs may have an effect and what that effect 
might be. 
 
IV. A Panel Study; Differentiated Treatment Effects 
 While the previous results disconfirmed a uniform and statistically significant effect of 
TELs, the coefficients of our variables indicating the presence of a revenue or spending limit 
were both negative and nearing the 15% confidence level.  It may well be that certain kinds of 
TELs, under certain conditions, are indeed effective.  We would not be able to find this in the 
pooled model presented above.  As such, the next step in our analysis is to unpack the singular 
treatment variable used to indicate the presence or absence of a TEL.  This weakens the 
assumption in the differences-in-difference model that all TELs have a uniform effect.  We break 
down this variable in a manner following New (2001) and Stansel (1994) by looking at the legal 
provisions of TELs.   Specifically, we look at whether or not a TEL is constitutional versus 
statutory, whether it limits state and local fiscal outcomes or simply state  fiscal outcomes and 
whether it limits spending to increases in inflation versus any other less stringent benchmark, 
such as per-capita income. 
Looking at these three provisions alone, we identify seven different types of spending 
limits and four different types of revenue limits that have been enacted in the states. Type One is 
a statutory TEL that only limits state spending and is not tied to inflation. Type Two is a 
constitutional TEL that only limits state spending and is not tied to inflation. Type Three is a 
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constitutional TEL that limits both state and local spending but is not tied to inflation. Type Four 
is a statutory TEL that covers both state and local spending but is not tied to inflation.  Type Five 
is a statutory TEL that is tied to inflation but only limits state spending.  Type Six is a statutory 
TEL that is both tied to inflation and limits both state and local spending.  Finally, Type Seven is 
the most stringent type of TEL by the letter of the law, one that is constitutional, limits both state 
and local spending, and is tied to inflation.   Table 4 indicates how limits in different states fall 
into these seven groupings.12  
  [Insert Table 4 Here]   
The analysis presented in this section parallels our differences-in-differences analysis, 
except in the specification our treatment variable: We use state and year fixed effects, a first-
differenced dependent variable, and panel-correlated standard errors.   The reference category in 
each of these regressions is the state-years where no TEL is in place.  
[Insert Tables 5 Here] 
We test for the effect of our seven treatment variables on both state and local spending, 
state and local revenue, and state only spending.  The results of this exercise appear in Tables 5 
and 6.  Looking first at the seven groupings of spending limits, it is evident that only one of the 
seven types of TELs had a negative and significant effect on changes in spending per-capita.  In 
addition, two of the groups have positive coefficients and one is significant.  The group with a 
significant effect is Type Two, representing a constitutional TEL that limits only state spending 
and is not tied to increases in inflation.  This result is surprising because this is among the types 
of TELs that is generally considered to have weak provisions.  The states within this grouping 
are Texas, Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Oklahoma.  We will return to this 
finding when we analyze the states individually.13  
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   [Insert Table 6 Here] 
We turn now to the results for the four groupings of revenue limits.  These results show 
that all four types of revenue limits have insignificant effects on revenue per-capita.  While all 
the coefficients’ signs were negative, no coefficient approached traditional levels of significance.  
These results do not provide much evidence for the effectiveness of TELs, but we nonetheless 
want to go one step further and to analyze the effectiveness of TELs on a state-by-state basis. 
 
V. Individual State-by-State Time-Series Analysis 
 
In this section we estimate ordinary least-squares, time-series  regressions for each state 
individually.  This research design takes into account two important possibilities not accounted 
for in previous research: 1) Spending and revenue respond to different factors in different states 
and 2) TELs vary and are unlikely to have uniform effects on fiscal activities. As before, we use 
spending per-capita as the dependent variable for states that passed spending limits and revenue 
per-capita for states that passed revenue limits.  We again first difference our dependent variable. 
Using the same acronyms as employed above, our state-by-state specification for an 
individual state at time t is as follows.  Instead of time dummies, we rely on a linear time trend.  
This variable allows us to treat time in our individual time series regressions in a manner that is 
similar to the manner in which we treat time in our panel study, where we used fixed year 
effects. 
∆(FBt) = α + t1 (TELt) + γ1∆(SAPt) + γ2(SAPt) + γ3∆(EPt) + γ4(EPt) + γ5∆(PCIt) + γ6(PCIt) +  
γ7(HDt) + γ8(SDt) + γ9(GDt) + γ10TRENDt εi 
If a TEL puts a state on a course toward smaller government than it would otherwise have 
followed, the coefficient on the dummy variable signifying TEL implementation will be negative 
and significant.  Yet in nearly every case, the TEL effect fell short of significance, while other 
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factors appeared to exert important influences on spending.  For example, in California, the first 
differences of per-capita income and school age population rate both significantly increased 
spending.   While none of the other variables in the model were significant, the model still 
explains almost half of all variations in state spending.  Most importantly, and consistent with 
previous studies of California (Kiewiet and Szakaly 1996; Kousser, McCubbins, and Rozga 
2007), the variable indicating TEL implementation is not significant.  This pattern is typical for 
the regressions that we estimated in each TEL state.   
    [Insert Table 7 Here] 
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors from each of these 
regressions for our treatment variable, the implementation of a TEL.  We conduct this analysis 
on both state and local spending as well as state-only spending.  We omit the estimated effects of 
the covariates in this discussion, but make the full results of all regressions available at 
http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu.  Of the twenty states that passed spending limits in our sample, only 
one significantly reduced state and local spending at the 5% level following the implementation 
of a TEL, Colorado.14  The coefficient for the TEL variable in Colorado’s analysis, -3.07, 
suggests that the implementation of this state’s TEL, ceteris peribus, led to a $348 decrease in 
changes in state and local expenditures per-capita once its effect is converted into 2005 dollars.  
This is a sizable amount, especially relative to the effects typically found in the literature that 
pools all TELs together (thus watering down the singularly strong Colorado effect). We will 
return to a discussion of Colorado in the conclusion.   
While this is an important demonstration that a single TEL was effective, the 
overwhelming message of the table is that only one of twenty spending limits appears successful 
at reducing state and local spending at the 5% confidence level. This number of significant 
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effects is not more than would be expected due to chance alone, although we do not believe the 
experience of Colorado to be chance. The verdict is even worse for state-only level spending, 
since no TEL significantly reduced spending in that arena.  Further, the fact that there is an 
almost equal mix of positive and negative coefficients suggests that these results are not simply 
an artifact of low-powered estimates. 15   
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Table 8 also demonstrates that of the seven states that passed revenue limits in our 
sample, not a single one appears to have significantly reduced revenue following the 
implementation of a TEL.  In fact, the coefficients of the TEL variable indicate increased 
revenue collection more often than not.  While several panel studies and cross-sectional studies 
have found TEL effects, neither our differences-in-differences nor our state-by-state designs 
reveal much evidence that TELs, in and of themselves, have affected state fiscal policy at all.  If 
it were true that TELs had an effect, it should have manifested itself in these tests.  We now turn 
to a “hunting” expedition, in which we will impose even stronger assumptions on the data in 
order to be as generous as possible to the hypothesis that TELs exert an effect.  
 
VI. Matching Structural Breaks to TEL Implementation 
 It is possible that TEL effects do not occur immediately in the first year in which the 
measure is implemented.  Here, we allow the timing of a potential TEL effect to vary around that 
year.  If a TEL systematically altered state fiscal activities, either suddenly or gradually, its 
implementation would coincide with a structural break in the economic time series.   
  The case of Idaho exemplifies why structural break analysis is important.  Figure 1 
graphically presents Idaho’s state and local spending per-capita relative to the spending of all 
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states that did not adopt a TEL.  As is clear in the figure, Idaho indeed experienced a structural 
break that decreased spending, but this was several years prior to TEL implementation.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 To test for this structural breaks, we use the Clemente, Montañés, Reyes (1998) unit root 
tests with one structural break.  To account for the possibility of another event that significantly 
affected fiscal activity more than a TEL, such as the passage of a property tax limitation act or 
the enactment of the income tax, we also implement the Clemente, Montañés, Reyes (1998) unit 
root tests with two structural breaks. Fundamentally, in searching for a unit root, we are 
searching for a change in trend, or a change in the generating function for a time-series. Using 
first differences would make finding such a break problematic. Thus for this test, we use the 
undifferenced fiscal behavior for each state in each year as our dependent variable.  
 Each test for structural breaks is implemented using both the Additive-Outlier (AO) 
model and the Innovative-Outlier (IO) model proposed by Perron (1989).  The IO model is 
useful to demonstrate a gradual shift in the mean occurring slowly over time. The AO model is 
useful to demonstrate a break that occurs abruptly, like a crash. For full specifications of each 
model see Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Clemente, Montañés, Reyes (1998).  Each model 
utilizes an endogenous selection procedure wherein the break date is selected when the t-statistic 
for testing unit roots is minimized. 
 Our findings show that the implementation of a TEL is rarely associated with a structural 
break in state fiscal activity.  Only two out of twenty states with spending limits were identified 
as having structural breaks coinciding with the implementation of a TEL: Missouri and, again, 
Colorado. As shown in Figure 2, an abrupt structural break is evident in Colorado in the same 
years its TEL was implemented.  This figure also shows that a gradual break in spending was 
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identified in Missouri in the same year as its TEL implementation. Not surprisingly given the 
regression results, no structural breaks in state and local revenue per-capita coincide with the 
implementation of a revenue TEL. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Of the twenty states that passed spending limits, five had structural breaks in the exact 
fiscal year, or fiscal year prior to, passage of a TEL (but thus in each case at least a year prior to 
its implementation).  Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, Utah, and Washington all experienced 
such “early” structural breaks.  This finding may speak to the anticipation of constituent 
demands for lower spending by state legislators, and thus suggests that TELs are endogenous to 
the state’s spending “mood.”  However, it also shows endogeneity was not problematic in the 
other states.  Nor does this finding lead to the conclusion that the TELs by themselves were 
effective.  These results do suggest that perhaps TELs together with a certain constellation of 
political forces are needed for fiscal reform.  More importantly, they suggest a reason why many 
cross-sectional studies have identified apparent decreases in spending linked to TELs: The 
enactment of fiscal limits may represent verification that a tax revolt has already occurred in a 
state, even though they are not powerful weapons in that revolutionary struggle.   
If the passage of these limits – either by voters or by legislators themselves – is the 
symbol rather than the cause of a shift toward decreased expenditures, then their presence will be 
correlated with lower spending.  Our time series analysis within each state, though, makes it 
clear that this correlation is indeed an artifact.  We are not the first to point out this endogeneity 
and its potential consequences (See Reuben 1997, Shadbegian 1998).  These arguments make it 
clear that endogeneity would act in favor of TELs being effective at decreasing state spending, 
and suggest that their real effects may only be discerned with a research design that takes 
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endogeneity seriously.  We have attempted to do so, and find that only in rare cases do TELs, in 
and of themselves, have bite.16  
 
 
VII. Explaining Why TELs Fail to Reduce Spending 
 
As we noted in the beginning of this paper, TELs are subject to a principal-agent 
dilemma.  TELs attempt to lock in the preferences of a set of political principals, voters or 
legislators at one time, by constraining the future actions of potentially hostile agents, legislators 
at a later time.  As shown in our empirical section, only in rare circumstances do these 
constraints work.  We highlight a few ways in which state elected officials avoid the bite of 
TELs, often without repercussions due to inadequate monitoring. 
We frame this explanation, following Kousser, McCubbins, and Rozga (2007), with an 
example from one of the famous cases of a high spending state, California. California’s spending 
limit, Proposition 4, passed with 74.3% of the vote in a November, 1979 special election. The so-
called Gann limit sets a cap on the expenditure of revenues from taxation, which increases over 
time based on a population plus inflation index. The key detail that hindered the Gann limit’s 
impact on state spending, however, was that it limited only expenditures of revenues from 
taxation.  The exclusion of non-tax revenues in the calculation of the Gann limit left many 
avenues open for the state to raise money that it could spend freely.  
For instance, in fiscal year 1979 and years following, California witnessed a sharp 
increase in the portion of its revenues that it raised from charges and fees, which were 
categorized as non-tax revenues.  In fiscal year 1969, charges and fees made up 18.1% of the 
state’s revenue (compared to 22.4% in the average non-TEL state); by 1979, the state’s figure 
increased to 23.3% (compared to 25.8% in the comparison group).  By 1994, California’s 
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proportion, 31.6%, exceeded the comparable group average of 30.9%.  Although this rise in 
taxes and fees is most likely also a byproduct of Proposition 13, the property tax limit and 
supermajority requirement passed in early 1978, it also worked as a method of adapting to the 
state’s spending limit.    
We test this hypothesis using regression analysis.  We run ordinary least squares 
regressions individually in each state with the proportion of charges and fees as our dependent 
variable.  Our estimation is as follows, with the dependent variable being the amount of charges 
and fees (CF) collected by state and local governments as a proportion of all general revenues.  
For an individual state at time t we estimate: 
(CFi) = α + β1 (TELt) +  γ2(SAPt) + γ3(EPt) + γ4(PCIt) +  γ5(HDt) + γ6(SDt) + γ7(GDt) + 
γ8(TRENDt)  + εi 
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The results of these regressions, reported in Table 9, show that 20 of 23 states had in increase in 
charges and fees following their TELs.  We combine both spending and revenue limits into a 
single table.  Five of those states increased their proportion of charges and fees following the 
enactment of a tax and expenditure limit significantly at the 5% level.  Two states, Utah and 
North Carolina, significantly reduced reliance on charges and fees.  These results suggest that 
government responses to TELs warrant further analysis.   
 
VIII.  Where a TEL Worked: Colorado 
 
 Our evidence from Table 7 suggests that Colorado’s TEL was the only limit that 
successfully reduced state and local expenditures.  This section explores how and why 
Colorado’s TEL was able to successfully reduce state expenditures.   Colorado’s Taxpayer’s Bill 
of Rights (TABOR) initiative, passed in 1992, 17 has many of the characteristics that prior 
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research would suggest are necessary to ensure its success.  This constitutional amendment limits 
all taxes and revenues at the state and local level, and requires voter approval for any tax 
increases or to change TABOR itself.  These provisions means that TABOR is quite strict in the 
letter of its law; most TELs limit only revenue or expenditures and half of all TELs limit only 
state fiscal activity, not local government as well.  The caps on expenditures and revenues are 
indexed partially to inflation, which generally grows at a slower rate than previously popular 
TEL indexes such as personal income (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2005).  In 
sum, the amendment’s drafters appear to have learned from the mistakes of past TELs.   
Political conditions in Colorado also generally bode well for the initiative’s effectiveness.  
Colorado had a Republican-controlled legislature throughout the period of our study, but 
TABOR came into effect just when gubernatorial party control was beginning to shift.  The state 
was moving from the era of moderate Democratic governors Dick Lamm (1974-1986) and Roy 
Romer (1986-1998) into conservative Republican Bill Owens’ tenure.  Presumably, a unified 
Republican government would be unlikely to attempt to circumvent the spirit of a TEL.  Even 
though it was externally imposed by a citizen initiative, TABOR set limits that subsequent state 
lawmakers, especially after 1998, would want to follow.  
 The acid test of TABOR effectiveness, however, came in the years following the end of 
our empirical analysis when the spirit of TABOR began to be undermined.  The Colorado 
legislature passed a higher education voucher plan that awarded money to students who then 
took the money to a state university or one of a few private universities participating in the plan. 
Prior to the higher education voucher plan, state money given directly to the universities  was 
subject to TABOR revenue limits.  However, with this change, money flowed to students and 
then to public universities, thus escaping the cap imposed by TABOR.  This allowed state 
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universities to raise tuition as they saw fit (Frates 2005). The design of this voucher plan is a 
classic example of how political agents attempt to work around the limits imposed by their 
principals, and suggests that even if TABOR appears successful on its face we have to be aware 
of how the state has increased tuition and/or fees in other areas that used to be funded by the 
state. 
 Finally, the epilogue to the TABOR story illustrates how spending limits can be easily 
undone when it is easy to amend the constitution.  By 2005, anticipated cuts under TABOR were 
so severe that Colorado’s Republican Governor Bill Owens, a fiscal conservative, backed a drive 
to call a five year “Timeout for TABOR” (Halper, 2005).  Because Colorado has the initiative 
process, Owens was able to work with legislative leaders and the state’s political establishment 
to place this temporary suspension of the state’s spending cap on the November 1st, 2005 ballot 
as Proposition C.  In an election that featured only half as much turnout as the contest in which 
TABOR first passed, Prop. C won with 52% of the vote while its companion Prop. D – which 
would have earmarked how state officials could spend their new money – failed (Brown, 2005).  
At least for the next five years, Colorado lawmakers will have great freedom to spend what they 





Based upon the logic of principal-agent relationships, we doubted that those who enact 
tax and spending limits would be able to constrain the future actions of lawmakers possessed of 
different goals and direct control of state purse strings.  With only one exception, the data 
confirmed these doubts.  The answer to our question of “Can state tax and expenditure limits 
effectively reduce spending and revenues?” is a clear “No.”    Records of spending and revenue 
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patterns show that TELs have in almost every instance failed to constrain the size of government 
in American states.  
Building on the existing literature, we took advantage of the relatively recent adoption of 
TELs in the states to estimate differences-in-differences models of their policy impact..  Instead 
of exclusively looking for a common TEL effect across states, we built towards a model that 
looked for an effect within each state individually.  This method allows for varied effects of 
different TELs and enables us to hold constant the myriad factors which determine state 
spending or revenue patterns.  We have argued that cross-sectional analyses fall short in this 
regard because they are unable to successfully hold constant all the relative differences that 
effect state spending and are subject to selection biases.  Using this method, our full multivariate 
analyses show that in only one state, Colorado, was there a significant indication that a TEL 
succeeded in reducing state and local spending per-capita.  There was some level of support for 
the hypothesis that Missouri’s TEL also constrained state fiscal policy.  Additionally, no state 
with a revenue limit successfully reduced state and local revenues per-capita.  As these results do 
not greatly surpass what we would expect to find by chance alone, we conclude that TELs in and 
of themselves are not effective mechanisms for budgetary control.   
We believe that our findings have significant implications for a wider literature.  As 
noted, many TELs are passed through the initiative process.  The inability of voters (principals) 
to constrain their legislators and governors (agents) in this instance casts doubt upon the overall 
effectiveness of the initiative process.  As noted in Gerber et al. 2001, “initiatives do not 
implement or enforce themselves” (Gerber et al. 2001 p. 109).  We agree with this assertion and 
argue that officials in the vast majority of states have been able to circumvent the TELs that were 
intended to limit them.   
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Table 1. States Enacting Tax and Expenditure Limits, 1969-2001 









Alaska 1982  constitutional inflation 
Arizona 1978  constitutional income 
California 1979  constitutional income 
Colorado 1992 1992 constitutional inflation 
Connecticut 1991  statutory greater of two 
Florida  1994 constitutional income 
Hawaii 1978  constitutional income 
Idaho 1980  statutory income 
Louisiana 1993 1991 constitutional income 
Massachusetts  1996 statutory state wages 
Michigan  1978 constitutional income 
Missouri 1980 1996 constitutional state revenues 
Montana 1981  statutory income 
Nevada 1979, 1984  statutory inflation 
New Jersey 1990  statutory income 
North Carolina 1991  statutory income 
Oklahoma 1985  constitutional inflation 






Rhode Island 1992  constitutional state revenues 
South Carolina 1980  constitutional greater of two 
Tennessee 1978  constitutional income 
Texas 1978  constitutional income 
Utah 1989  statutory both 
Washington 1993 1979 statutory inflation 
Notes: Data on the presence and timing of TELs is taken from Poterba and Rueben (1999), and 
details of their constitutional status and indexing mechanism from National Conference of State 
Legislatures (2005). Colorado passed a statutory spending limit in 1991 and then a 
constitutional limit in 1992. Nevada’s 1979 limit was nonbinding, according to Poterba and 
Rueben (1999), and Oregon’s recent passages of both tax and expenditure limits are taken from 
National Conference of State Legislatures (2005). Because of Alaska’s unique fiscal conditions – 
state revenues fluctuate dramatically with price changes in taxed natural resources – we exclude 
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Table 2. Differences-in-Differences Estimate of the Effect of Spending Limits  
 
Dependent Variable: Changes in Spending Per-Capita 
 State and Local State Only 
Spending Limit -0.186 -0.0768 
  (0.13) (0.11) 
Elderly Population Rate 0.813 -6.890 
  (9.96) '(9.87) 
School Age Population Rate -11.82 -8.531 
  (7.69) (6.69) 
Per-Capita Income 0.00943 0.00448 
  (0.0088) (0.0085) 
Changes in Elderly Population Rate -117.9** -53.69 
  (49.9) (39.4) 
Changes in School Age Population Rate -22.91 -23.48 
  (26.0) (22.9) 
Changes in Per-Capita Income 0.0667*** 0.0247 
  (0.019) (0.017) 
Democratic Governor 0.0302 0.0585 
  (0.070) (0.061) 
Democratic Lower House -0.0546 -0.0657 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
Democratic Upper House 0.179 0.207* 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
State Fixed Effects Included Included 
    
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
    
Constant 1.978 2.657 
  (3.12) (3.09) 
    
Observations 1420 1420 
Number of States 49 49 
R-squared 0.33 0.29 
    
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 3. Differences-in-Differences Estimate of the Effect of Revenue Limits  
 
Dependent Variable: Changes in State and Local 
Revenue Per-Capita 
Revenue limit  -0.244 
  (0.17) 
Elderly Population Rate -3.963 
  (9.29) 
School Age Population Rate -15.84** 
  (7.89) 
Per-Capita Income 0.00595 
  (0.0100) 
Changes in Elderly Population Rate 12.79 
  (68.7) 
Changes in School Age Population Rate -42.63 
  (30.8) 
Changes in Per-Capita Income 0.0494** 
  (0.021) 
Democratic Governor 0.127 
  (0.080) 
Democratic Lower House -0.133 
  (0.14) 
Democratic Upper House 0.240* 
 (0.14) 
State Fixed Effects Included 
  
Year Fixed Effects Included 
   
Constant 3.003 
  (3.05) 
Observations 1420 
Number of States 49 
R-squared 0.26 
   
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05   
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1 No No No LA, MT, NC WA 
2 Yes No No TX, CT, RI, SC, OK FL, MO 
3 Yes Yes No AZ, CA, TN, HI, MO MI 
4 No Yes No ID, NJ, OR MA 
5 No No Yes NV   
6 No Yes Yes WA, UT   
7 Yes Yes Yes CO CO 
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Table 5. Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Spending Limits, by type  




Local State Only 
Type 1 Spending Limit (NC, S, O) 0.00943 0.144 
  (0.23) (0.19) 
Type 2 Spending Limit (C, S, O) -0.379** -0.365** 
  (0.17) (0.17) 
Type 3 Spending Limit (C, SL, O) -0.432 0.148 
  (0.41) (0.17) 
Type 4 Spending Limit (NC, SL, O) -0.309 -0.0408 
  (0.32) (0.48) 
Type 5 Spending Limit (NC, S, I) -0.439 -0.805 
  (0.73) (0.47) 
Type 6 Spending Limit (NC, SL, I) -0.0114 0.0579 
  (0.46) (0.29) 
Type 7 Spending Limit (C, SL, I) -0.593 -0.0259 
  (0.41) (0.35) 
Elderly Population Rate 0.984 -6.194 
  (9.79) (9.62) 
School Age Population Rate -11.31 -8.720 
  (8.21) (6.96) 
Per-Capita Income 0.0111 0.00517 
  (0.0088) (0.0083) 
Changes in Elderly Population Rate -112.8** -52.81 
  (51.3) (40.6) 
Changes in School Age Population Rate -21.88 -22.28 
  (26.9) (23.0) 
Changes in Per-Capita Income 0.0659*** 0.0237 
  (0.019) (0.017) 
Democratic Governor 0.0247 0.0482 
  (0.071) (0.062) 
Democratic Lower House -0.0508 -0.0573 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
Democratic Upper House 0.172 0.195* 
  (0.12) (0.12) 
State Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included 
Constant 1.651 
2.527 
  (3.19) (3.04) 
Observations 1420 1420 
Number of States 49 49 
R-squared 0.33 0.29 
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05     
 
Note: C: Constitutional, NC: Non-Constitutional, SL: State and Local, S: State Only, I:Pegged to Inflation, O: 
Pegged to Other mechanism 
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Table 6. Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Effects of Revenue Limits, by type  
Dependent Variable: Changes in State and 
Local Revenue Per-Capita 
Type 1 Revenue Limit (NC, S, O) 0.00594 
  (0.42) 
Type 2 Revenue Limit (C, S, O) -0.140 
  (0.31) 
Type 3 Revenue Limit (C, SL, O) -0.427 
  (0.41) 
Type 4 Revenue Limit (NC, SL, O) -0.447 
  (0.39) 
Type 7 Revenue Limit (C, SL, I) -0.0343 
  (0.37) 
Elderly Population Rate -3.353 
  (9.37) 
School Age Population Rate -16.23** 
  (7.89) 
Per-Capita Income 0.00639 
  (0.010) 
Changes in Elderly Population Rate 15.61 
  (68.9) 
Changes in School Age Population Rate -42.57 
  (30.9) 
Changes in Per-Capita Income 0.0489** 
  (0.021) 
Democratic Governor 0.122 
  (0.081) 
Democratic Lower House -0.133 
  (0.14) 
Democratic Upper House 0.242 
  (0.14) 
State Fixed Effects Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included 
Constant 2.942 
  (3.06) 
Observations 1420 
Number of States 49 
R-squared 0.26 
   
Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05   
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Table 7. State-by-State Estimates of the Effects of Spending Limits  
  Changes in State and Local  
Per-Capita Spending 
Changes in State Only  
Per-Capita Spending 
  Coefficient (Standard Error) R-Squared 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) R-Squared 
Arizona -1.45(1.31) 0.45 -0.39(0.99) 0.53 
California -1.21(1.54) 0.45 0.19(1.24) 0.46 
Colorado 3.07(1.04)** 0.56 -1.34(.22) 0.51 
Connecticut 0.10(1.41) 0.76 0.09(2.00) 0.51 
Hawaii 3.87(2.93) 0.43 4.24(2.65) 0.39 
Idaho 1.3(0.92) 0.78 -0.10(0.96) 0.39 
Louisiana 1.46(1.58) 0.34 -1.19 (1.32) 0.26 
Missouri -0.95(1.51) 0.34 -0.16 (1.04) 0.35 
Montana 0.89(1.88) 0.30 -0.33 (1.16) 0.27 
Nevada -1.57(3.65) 0.30 1.29 (2.47) 0.15 
New Jersey 0.53(3.01) 0.32 -1.90(5.76) 0.19 
North Carolina -1.07(0.72) 0.69 0.35 (0.70) 0.40 
Oklahoma 0.09(1.70) 0.11 -1.83(1.42) 0.54 
Oregon -1.61(3.22) 0.27 0.08(2.58) 0.30 
Rhode Island -1.64(1.85) 0.23 -3.76(0.25) 0.22 
South Carolina 0.69(1.44) 0.41 0.16(0.96) 0.42 
Tennessee -2.30(1.59) 0.43 -0.81 (1.37) 0.19 
Texas 0.31(1.07) 0.34 0.98 (0.81) 0.37 
Utah -2.88(1.69) 0.56 -0.40 (1.49) 0.27 
Washington 0.05(1.83) 0.48 -0.30 (1.49) 0.42 
 
Notes: Each line presents coefficients and standard errors for a TEL indicator variable, taken from a 
separate time-series regression estimated in each state and controlling for a linear annual trend, per 
capita income, population % aged 5 to 17, population % aged 65 and over, changes in per capita income, 
changes in population % aged 5 to 17, changes in population % aged 65 and over, and dummy variables 
for democratic control of the governor’s office, lower legislative house, and upper legislative house.  A * 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5% confidence level.  Full regression results 
available at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu.  
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Table 8. State-by-State Estimates of the Effects of Revenue Limits  
 
  Changes in State and Local  
Per-Capita Revenue 
  Coefficient (Standard Error) R-Squared 
Colorado 0.25 (1.66) 0.40 
Florida -0.66 (1.44) 0.58 
Louisiana -0.23 (1.63) 0.22 
Massachusetts -3.12 (2.02) 0.48 
Michigan -2.21 (1.87) 0.45 
Missouri 1.47 (1.58) 0.44 
Washington 1.84 (2.06) 0.61 
 
Notes: Each line presents coefficients and standard errors for a TEL indicator variable, taken from a 
separate time-series regression estimated in each state and controlling for a linear annual trend, per 
capita income, population % aged 5 to 17, population % aged 65 and over, changes in per capita income, 
changes in population % aged 5 to 17, changes in population % aged 65 and over, and dummy variables 
for democratic control of the governor’s office, lower legislative house, and upper legislative house.  A * 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5% confidence level.  Full regression results 
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Table 9.  State-by-State Estimates of the Effects of TELs on Charges and Fees 
 
 
Notes: Each line presents coefficients and standard errors for a TEL indicator variable, taken from a 
separate time-series regression estimated in each state and controlling for a linear annual trend, per 
capita income, population % aged 5 to 17, population % aged 65 and over, changes in per capita income, 
changes in population % aged 5 to 17, changes in population % aged 65 and over, and dummy variables 
for democratic control of the governor’s office, lower legislative house, and upper legislative house.  A ** 
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 5% confidence level.  Full regression results 





DV: Charges Fees as a proportion 
of General Revenue 
 Coefficient (se) R-Squared 
Arizona 0.030 (0.021) 0.88 
California 0.016 (0.015) 0.96 
Colorado -0.017 (0.011) 0.95 
Connecticut -0.012 (0.011) 0.92 
Florida -0.0116 (0.012) 0.96 
Hawaii 0.038 (0.021) 0.77 
Idaho 0.01 (0.014) 0.94 
Louisiana -0.009 (0.017) 0.93 
Massachusetts 0.013 (0.008) 0.98 
Michigan 0.028** (0.011) 0.96 
Missouri 0.012 (0.009) 0.95 
Montana 0.075** (0.037) 0.94 
Nevada 0.052** ( 0.01) 0.92 
New Jersey 0.01 (0.009) 0.96 
North Carolina -0.02** (0.008) 0.96 
Oklahoma 0.041** (0.010) 0.79 
Oregon 0.009 (0.021) 0.95 
Rhode Island -0.028 (0.015) 0.94 
South Carolina 0.023** (0.012) 0.96 
Tennessee 0.007 (0.016) 0.91 
Texas 0.007 (0.01) 0.95 
Utah -0.065** (0.022) 0.72 
Washington -0.002 (0.008) 0.87 
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1 On agency in general, see for example Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Ross (1973), Holstrom (1979), Grossman and 
Hart (1983), and Bernheim and Whinston (1986). The problem could also be that there are multiple principals and 
that the principals change over time, a social choice problem. In either event, it is a hard problem.  
2 Smith (1998) demonstrates that this was the intent of most TEL proponents.  One of the authors of California’s 
1979 spending limit, Craig Stubblebine, reports that while some proponents of TELs  aimed to shrink the size of 
state government overall, others (such as himself) merely wanted to limit tax revenues so that residents would pay 
more fees only for the services they choose to use.  This is an example of multiple principals with conflicting 
preferences, a condition that can make principal-agent problems even more difficult to overcome. (Telephone 
interview conducted by Thad Kousser on March 25, 2005).    
3 We find evidence of this as well.  We compare states considered “overspenders” at the time their TEL was passed 
to all “overspending” states that never passed TELs.  Overspending is operationalized as per-capita spending more 
than the average of our comparable group of the 24 states that never passed TELs.  The “overspending” states that 
passed TELs consistently spend less than those that did not pass TELs, even before any TELs were passed.  This is 
evidence that TEL states are different than non-TEL states in systematic ways, even before the TELs were passed.  
Further explanation of this analysis and a useful graph are available at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu.   
4 For important exceptions to this approach, see Stansel (1994) and New (2001), which feature specifications that 
allow different types of TELs to have distinct effects.  Stansel (1994) finds that TELs are more likely to be 
effectively when they apply to all types of spending or revenues (rather than taxes only), and when they require 
voter approval to override.  New (2001) shows that TELs linked to personal income growth are less effective than 
those tied to inflation, and finds suggestive evidence that limits that are passed by legislatures themselves are less 
effective than those imposed by initiatives.    
5 In this paper, we do not make conjectures about the effectiveness of TELs that only apply to specific types of 
taxes,  such as property to sales tax limits.  It may very well be that specific TELs are more effective than general 
TELs, perhaps due to ease of monitoring (Gerber et al.  2001).   
6 The data and coding used for the analysis in this paper are available upon request from the authors or can be 
downloaded at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu.  We are grateful to the research assistance of Geoffrey Peppler in 
assembling this dataset.  We gathered data for fiscal years 1997-2000 from the Census’ website, 
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html, accessed in March, 2005.  The data from fiscal years 1969-1996 
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was recorded from hard copies of the census publication.  Unfortunately, the Census does not report state-by-state 
detailed spending and revenue figures from fiscal year 2001, ending our time series.     
7 The implicit price deflator is commonly used for government financial data. This data is available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt 
8 Analysis is not run on state-only revenue due to lack of data availability. 
9 Population sources from the Census Bureau: Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States, 1970 to 
1980. http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/pre-1980/e7080sta.txt; Resident Population for Selected Age Groups: 
1980 to 1989, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/estage80.txt; Population Estimates for the U.S., 
Regions, and States by Selected Age Groups and Sex: Annual Time series, July 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999 (includes 
revised April 1, 1990 population counts) http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/ST-99-09.txt;  Single Year 
of Age and Sex Population Estimates: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2004 http://www.census.gov/popest/states/files/SC-
EST2004-AGESEX_RES.csv  
10 We also run this model without levels on the left-hand side of the equation.  Theoretically, this suggests that 
legislators do not take account of current levels of expenditure when making year adjustments.  In this model, the 
TEL variable falls just short of significance at the 5% level.  Results are available at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu.  
11 We also test for an immediate effect of TELs by using a first-differenced version of our treatment variable.  This 
specification of the variable is never significant.  These results are available at http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu. 
12 Poterba and Reuben 1998 identify Louisiana as passing a 1991 binding revenue limit. Unfortunately, we were not 
able to readily locate the legal provisions for this TEL so it is excluded from this analysis. 
13 TELs fare worse in an analysis of an immediate effect on spending, not reported here.  No type of TEL was 
significant at the 5% level in the analysis on either state only nor state and local spending. 
14 Regressions were also run controlling for the effects of federal aid.  We do not include aid in our primary model 
because it is an endogenous variable to state spending due to the practice of federal matching.  The inclusion of aid 
in our model has the following effects:  The Louisiana spending limit positively and significantly affects state and 
local spending.  The Rhode Island spending limit negatively and significantly affects state and local spending.  The 
Massachusetts revenue limit negatively and significantly reduces state and local revenue. 
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15 We also estimated these models with a first-differenced version of the treatment variable.  This variable, coded as 
1 in the first year of TEL implementation and 0 in all other years, would capture any abrupt changes in spending or 
revenue that occur immediately when the TEL was implemented.  This variable had a significant and negative 
coefficient in only one case, South Carolina. 
16 As a simple test of the endogeneity hypothesis, we test for direction of causality as derived by Granger (1969) and 
popularized by Sims (1972). The Granger Causality test involves using a series of F-tests to test whether lagged 
information on a variable Y provides any statistically significant information about a variable X in the presence of 
lagged X.  In this case, our Y variable is total state and local spending per-capita and our X variable is the dummy 
variable indicating implementation of a TEL.  In only one state, California, do we find a significant relationship 
between both variables, meaning Granger-causality runs in both directions. Spending affects the presence of the 
TEL in only 2 states, Washington and Rhode Island.  Finally, there is modest indication that a TEL Granger-causes 
spending in Arizona, Louisiana, and Tennessee. 
17 The Colorado General Assembly did pass a spending limit in 1991 (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2005), but since TABOR came in the next year, it is not possible to measure the impact of this TEL. 
